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Intramilitary Immunity and Constitutional Torts
Alleged 1 violations of the constitutional rights of members of the
armed forces, often involving particularly disturbing conduct, have
attracted substantial public attention in the past several years. 2 If
one can believe the published accounts, soldiers have been beaten,3
kidnapped, tortured, and murdered,4 subjected to brutal correctional
practices,5 and forced to participate in dangerous experiments testing
the effects of powerful drugs6 and radiation7 on human subjects.
These reports are even more shocking when one considers that the
alleged perpetrators were not agents of a foreign government, but
fellow members of the military establishment. A number of injured
parties have attempted to recover damages for alleged constitutional
I. See, e.g., Jaffee v. United States, No. 79-1543 (3d Cir. Nov. 2, 1981) (en bane); Stanley v.
CIA, 639 F.2d 1146 (5th Cir. 1981); Tigue v. Swaim, 585 F.2d 909 (8th Cir. 1978); Sigler v.
LeVan, 485 F. Supp. 185 (D. Md. 1980); Misko v. United States, 453 F. Supp. 513 (D.D.C.
1978), qffd., 593 F.2d 1371 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Verified complaint at 2-3, Trerice v. United States,
No. 79-3172 (E.D. Mich., filed May 14, 1981) (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
2. See, e.g., Hughe & Konigsberg, Grim Legacy of Nuclear Testing, N.Y. Times, Apr. 22,
1979, § 6 (Magazine), at 34; Parents ofseaman who died demand $1 million.from NaV}', Detroit
Free Press, May I, 1981, § A, at 3, col. 4 (state ed.); Volgenau, NaV}' asks "not blind obedience,
just instant obedience," Detroit Free Press, May 10, 1981, § A, at 3, col. I; 116 Marine Recruits
Ordered in Line, Then Beaten, Wash. Post, July 7, 1979, § A, at 6, col. I.
For older accounts, see R. RIVKIN, G.I. RIGHTS AND ARMY JUSTICE 26-29 (1970);
R. SHERRILL, MILITARY JUSTICE Is TO JUSTICE AS MILITARY MUSIC Is TO MUSIC 4-61 (1970).
3. See 116 Marine Recruits Ordered in Line, Then Beaten, Wash. Post, July 7, 1979, § A, at
6, col. I.
4. See Sigler v. LeVan, 485 F. Supp. 185 (D. Md. 1980). In a suit against various military
defendants, the widow and daughter of an Army counterintelligence agent alleged a bizarre
tale that began after military intelligence officers discovered the decedent's intention to chronicle some of his experiences in a book following his imininent retirement. Sigler was allegedly
ordered to Washington, D.C. and then taken to motels in Maryland. Army intelligence officers
then confined and questioned him for nine days, after which he was found dead in a motel
room, wrapped in the stripped cord of an electrical lamp. The Army and the Maryland State
Police concluded that Sigler had cominitted suicide by electrocution. The plaintiffs claimed,
among other things, intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault and battery, false imprisonment, and violations of the first, fourth, and fifth amendments to the Constitution. 485
F. Supp. at 188-89.
S. See Verified Complaint at 2-3, Trerice v. United States, No. 79-3172 (E.D. Mich., filed
May 14, 1981) (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
6. Stanley v. CIA, 639 F.2d 1146 (5th Cir. 1981); Thornwell v. United States, 471 F. Supp.
344 (D.D.C. 1979).

1. See Jaffee v. United States, 468 F. Supp. 632 (D.N.J. 1979), qffd., No. 79-1543 (3d Cir.
Nov. 2. 1981) (en bpnc); Hughe & Konigsberg, supra note 2. In Jqffee, an ex-soldier alleged
that he suffered serious injury as a result of exposure to massive amounis-of radiation when an
atomic bomb was detonated 2000 yards from his location, six times closer than the minimum
distance then recommended by the Atomic Energy Cominission. The Department of Defense
has since stated that some 80,000 servicemen viewed various detonations from trenches as
close as one mile from ground zero during the testing program that lasted from November I,
1951 until July 17, 1962. Hughe & Konigsberg, supra note 2, at 78.
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violations by their superiors, 8 but most of these suits have been unsuccessful. Many did not even reach trial because the courts held
that the defendants, as federal officers,9 were entitled to some form
of official immunity. 10
The nature and scope of this immunity, however, are currently
unsettled. The Supreme Court has not specifically ruled on the
scope of official immunity for intramilitary torts in well over a century, 11 and the lower federal courts have not agreed to a single formulation. Some courts, relying on Feres v. United States, 12 have
held that intramilitary immunity is absolute and bars any suit, including one that alleges constitutional violations, brought by a serviceman injured "incident to service." 13 Other courts, giving greater
8. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), the Supreme Court
recognized a damage remedy for "constitutional torts" - violations of an individual's constitutional rights by federal officials acting under color of law. Congress expressly created a
similar remedy against state officials. See Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. XXII, 17 Stat. 13
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. III 1979)). See generally Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 8S HARV. L. REv. 1S32 (1972); Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: .Damage Actions, 77 HARV. L. REV. 209 (1963); Katz, The Jurisprudence of
Remedies: Constitutional LegalityandtheLawofTortsin Bell v. Hood, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 1,
8-33 (1968); Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L. REv. 5 (1980).
9. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. See also DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY PAMPHLET No. 2721, MILITARY ADMINISTRATIVE LAW HANDBOOK 3-13 (1973); D. ZILLMAN, A. BLAUSTEIN &
E. SHERMAN, THE MILITARY IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 2-30 (1978).
10. Immunity is largely a judge-made doctrine. See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, S69
(1959) (plurality opinion). See generally Jaffe, supra note 8; Comment, Civil Liability of
Subordinate State Officials Under the Federal Civil Rights Acts and the .Doctrine of Official Immunity, 44 CALIF. L. REV. 887 (19S6); Note, The .Doctrine of Official Immunity Under the Civil
Rights Acts, 68 HARv. L. REV. 1229 (1955). The speech or debate clause of the Federal Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1, establishes immunity for members of Congress.

11. Dinsman v. Wilkes, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 390 (1851).
12. 340 U.S. 135 (1950). InFeres, the Supreme Court held that an active-duty serviceman
may not sue the United States under the Federal Tort Clainrs Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346(b)1346(c), 1402(b), 1504, 2110, 240l(b), 2402, 241 l(b), 2412, 2671-80 (1976), for injuries resulting
from the negligence of fellow servicemen. See notes 104-06 infra and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., Martinez v. Schrock, 537 F.2d 765 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 970
(1977); Hass v. United States, 518 F.2d 1138 (4th Cir. 1975); Tirrill v. McNamara, 451 F.2d 579
(9th Cir. 1971); Bailey v. DeQuevedo, 375 F.2d 72 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 923 (1967);
Hinkie v. United States, No. 79-2340 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 20, 1981); Lombard v. United States, No.
81-0425 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 1981); Sigler v. LeVan, 485 F. Supp. 185 (D. Md. 1980); Schmid v.
Rumsfeld, 481 F. Supp. 19 (N.D. Cal. 1979); Nagy v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 383 (D.D.C.
1979); Thornwell v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 344 (D.D.C. 1979); Misko v. United States,
453 F. Supp. 513 (D.D.C. 1978), q/fd., 593 F.2d 1371 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Birdwell v. Schlesinger,
403 F. Supp. 710 (D. Colo. 1975); Levin v. United States, 403 F. Supp. 99 (D. Mass. 1975);
Moore v. Schlesinger, 384 F. Supp. 163 (D. Colo. 1974); Rotko v. Abrams, 338 F. Supp. 46 (D.
Conn. 1971), q/fd. per curiam, 455 F.2d 992 (2d Cir. 1972); Gamage v. Peal; 217 KSupp. 384
(N.D. Cal. 1962). In addition, the Third Circuit recently held that the principles underlying
military immunity precluded the availability of a cause of action directly under the Constitution against military defendants for unconstitutional conduct incident to service. See Jaffee v.
United States, No. 79-1543 (3d Cir. Nov. 2, 1981) (en bane).
Many courts have taken a very broad view of the term "incident to service." See, e.g.,
Henninger v. United States, 473 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 819 (1973);
Hass v. United States, 518 F.2d 1138 (4th Cir. 1975). But see Parker v. United States, 611 F.2d
1007 (5th Cir. 1980); Downes v. United States, 249 F. Supp. 626 (E.D.N.C. 1965).
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weight to more recent cases that reconcile traditional immunity principles with the interests served by causes of action for constitutional
torts, 14 have held that military officials may claim only a "qualified"
immunity against claims based upon their unconstitutional
conduct. 15
This Note examines the reasoning underlying these conflicting
approaches and concludes that a general rule of qualified immunity,
which more fully protects the constitutional rights of members of the
armed forces, is also consistent with the legitimate needs of the military establishment. Part I demonstrates that courts considering the
scope of immunity in constitutional tort cases cannot rely blindly
upon the rules and policies applicable in nonconstitutional cases, but
must also accommodate the constitutional interests. Part II applies
this principle to cases involving military officers. It argues in Section
A that Feres v. United States does not support an absolute immunity
rule in constitutional tort cases. Section B then analyzes the policies
affected by the choice of an immunity rule and contends that the
military's interest in discipline - the only functional justification for
absolute immunity - is well served by the qualified immunity that
has been established in other contexts.

I.

COMMON-LAW DEVELOPMENT OF THE IMMUNITY DOCTRINE

The immunity of public officials to liability for their wrongdoing
implicates "fundamentally antagonistic social policies." 16 On the
one hand, it is a basic tenet of Anglo-American jurisprudence that
no man is above the law. 17 This notion is rooted in practical, as well
as moral, considerations. Civil damages are intended to compensate
the victims oftortious conduct 18 and to deter tortfeasors from engag14. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978); Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. SSS
(1978); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (197S);
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974). See generally notes S4-94 infra and accompanying
text.
15. See Wallace v. Chappell, No. 79-3172 (9th Cir. Nov. 2, 1981); Alvarez v. Wilson, 431
F. Supp. 136 (N.D. lli. 1977). Cf. Tigue v. Swaim, S8S F.2d 909 (8th Cir. 1978) (according
absolute immunity in the particular case after considering the defendant's sensitive duties).
Several courts have narrowed the scope of military immunity in cases involving nonconstitutional torts. See Jackson v. Kelly, 557 F.2d 73S (10th Cir. 1977); Henderson v. Bluemink, S11
F.2d 399 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Crozman v. Callahan, 136 F. Supp. 466 (W.D. Okla. 195S).
16. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. S64, S76 (19S9) (plurality opinion).
17. "All the officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the
law, and are bound to obey it." Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, S06 (1978) (quoting United
States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882)). See Marbury v. Madison, S U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163
(1803) ("The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to
claim the protection of the laws."). See also A. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY AND
LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 193 (10th ed. 1959) (officials "from the Prime Minister down to a
constable" are liable for their wrongful acts).
18. See generally REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § S (1965).
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ing repeatedly in such conduct. 19 Official immunity may undermine
these fundamental goals. On the other hand, several factors related
to the peculiar roles of government officials indicate that some form
of immunity would be appropriate. Courts have suggested that it
may be unfair to impose personal liability on officials whose positions require the exercise of judgment and discretion. 20 It has also
been claimed that the threat of a damage suit may deter officials
from acting courageously in the public interest21 or discourage talented people from entering public service.22 Finally, if public officials must expend time and energy defending themselves in court,
their governmental responsibilities may suffer, to the public's
detriment. 23
These competing considerations can be balanced in several ways.
First, courts could accord officials absolute immunity, which completely protects persons acting within the scope of their official duties.24 Because this immunity defeats suits at the outset of the
litigation, it protects not only against liability but also against the
burdens of a trial. 25 Second, officials might receive only a qualified
immunity, which protects persons acting reasonably and in good
faith within the scope of their official duties. 26 Because the official
19. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 505 (1978).
20. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 239-40 (1974). See generally Gray, Private
Wrongs of Public Servants, 41 CALIF. L. REV. 303, 310 (1959); Jennings, Tort Liability far
Administrative Officers, 21 MINN. L. REV. 263, 271-72 tI937); Note, Damagesfar Federal Employment Discrimination: Section 1981 and Qua/flied Executive Immunity, 85 YALE L.J. 518,
527 (1976).
21. See, e.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 239-40 (1974); Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S.
483, 498-99 (1896); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347-48 (1871); Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949) (Learned Hand, J.) (civil liability would "dampen the
ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of
their duties"), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950).
22. See Miller v. Hope, 2 Shaw, H.L. 125, 134 (1824) (were he not immune for his mistakes, "no man but a beggar, or a fool, would be a Judge"); Jaffe, supra note 8, at 220 ("if they
have not made themselves beggars by conveying their property to their wives, they are indeed
fools").
23. See Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d at 581; Freed, Executive Official Immunityfor Constitutiona{ Violations: An Analysis and a Critique, 72 Nw. U. L. REv. 526, 530 (1977); Jennings,
supra note 20, at 271-72.
24. See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,427 (1976); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547
(1967); Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959) (plurality opinion). Cf. Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S.
463 (1896) (the scope of immunity includes actions which have more or less connection with
the general matters committed by law to his control or supervision).
25. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. at 419 n.13. The Court described the difference
between absolute and qualified immunity as follows:
The procedural difference between the absolute and the qualified immunities is important.
An absolute immunity defeats a suit at the outset, so long as the official's actions were
within the scope of the immunity. The fate of an official with qualified immunity depends
upon the circumstances and motivations of his actions, as established by the evidence at
trial.
26. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 320-22 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232,
238-39 (1974); Jaffe, supra note 8, at 221; Jennings, supra note 20, at 277-78.
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must prove good faith and reasonableness to claim this immunity,27
it does not protect against the burdens of a trial.28 Third, courts
could deny officials any immunity and hold them liable whenever
they act unlawfully. 29 Implicit in each of these approaches is the
different weight that its proponents give to the relevant interests.
Modem theories of immunity reconcile these opposing interests
so as to produce the best results. Courts generally examine the official's function and confer immunity only when the resulting public
benefits outweigh the costs.30 A grant of immunity thus depends not
on the official's "particular location within the government but [on]
the nature of [his] responsibilities."31 When an individual acting
within "the general scope of his official authority"32 exercises the discretion committed to his position,33 immunity protects him against
fear of damage suits arising from his conduct.34 Although some
courts and commentators are uneasy with an immunity doctrine limited to discretionary, as opposed to ministerial functions, 35 this distinction is consistent with the rationale underlying grants of
immunity - that the public interest requires decisions and actions
for its benefit and protection.36
The contours of the functional approach to immunity can be seen
by examining the immunity accorded judges, legislators, and admin27. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. at 419 n.13.
28. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 522-23 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
29. See Freed, supra note 23, at 527; cf. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980)
(in actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. III 1979), municipalities may not assert
qualified immunity defense based on the good faith of its officers).
30. As is so often the case, the answer must be found in a balance between the evils
inevitable in either alternative. In this instance it has been thought in the end better to
leave unredressed the wrongs done b)' dishonest officers than to subject those who try to
do their duty to the constant dread of retaliation.
Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950),
31. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478,511 (1978). See notes 95-99 infta and accompanying
text.
32. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 895 D, Comment g (1965). See generally Butz v.
Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 487-96 (1978); Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 492-99 (1896),
33. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895 D(3)(a) & Comment b (1965). Discretionary acts requiring personal judgment and deliberations contrast with ministerial acts which
demand little or no choice from public officials as to ''when, where, how or under what circumstances their acts are to be done." Id at Comment h. One commentator has characterized the
distinction as "finespun and more or less unworkable." w. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF TORTS 988 (4th ed. 1971). This view is widely accepted. See note 35 infta.
34. · See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959) (plurality opinion).
35. See, e.g., Ove Gustavsson Contracting Co. v. Floete, 299 F.2d 655, 659 (2d Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 374 U.S. 827 (1963); 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 29.14-.15
(1956); W. PROSSER, supra note 33, at 988; Freed, supra note 23, at 531 n.28; Jaffe, supra note 8,
at 218-25.
36. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 241-42 (1974). The distinction is generally applied only to administrative rather than to judicial or legislative officials. See W. PROSSER,
supra note 33, at 988-91; Gray, supra note 20, at 322-25.
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istrative officers. Judges37 and legislators38 have enjoyed the most
long-standing immunity. Courts immunize judges because the
proper administration of justice requires judicial independence unconstrained by fear of personal liability.39 A similar rationale supports legislative immunity. By freeing legislators to discuss issues
and reach decisions without fear of liability, immunity benefits their
constituents and society as a whole.40 To promote these goals,
judges and legislators are granted absolute immunity, which protects
them from liability and from having to stand trial41 even if they
acted with malice or in bad faith. 42
The immunity of administrative officers was less settled at early
common law than legislative and judicial immunity.43 The Supreme
Court first addressed the issue in Spalding v. Vilas, 44 where the Postmaster General had allegedly distributed information that injured
the plaintiff's reputation and damaged his contractual relations. The
Court found that the act was not "manifestly or palpably beyond
... [the official's] authority" but was "more or less connect[ed] with
the general matters committed by law to his control or supervision."45 Since the public policy consideration that underlies judicial
immunity - avoiding the effects of a potential damage suit on "the
proper and effective administration of public affairs" 46 - also applies to cabinet officials, the Court held that the Postmaster General
could not be held liable for damages, however improper his mo37. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335
(1871); Yates v. Lansing, 5 Johns. 282 (N.Y. 1810); Scott v. Stansfield, L.R. 3 Ex. 220 (1868);
Miller v. Hope, 2 Shaw, H.L. 125, 134 (1824); Floyd v. Barker, 77 Eng. Rep. 1305 (Star Chamber 1607).
38. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951); Kilbour_n v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 108_
(1881); Stockdale v. Hansard, 112 Eng. Rep. 1112 (Q.B. 1839). Legislative immunity in England was secured in the Bill of Rights of 1689: "That the freedom of speech, and debates or
proceedings in parliament, ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place out
of Parliament." 1 W. & M., Sess. 2, 2 (1688). This tradition was adopted in our "speech or
debate" clause. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
39. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335,
347 (1871); Jennings, supra note 20, at 271-72. Prosecutors and grand jurors were immune at
common law because their roles - exercising discretionary judgment based on the evidence
before tl!em - were functionally comparable to those of a judge. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424
U.S. at 423 n.20.
40. See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 615-16 (1972); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341
U.S. at 373-74. See generally Gray, supra note 20, at 318-22.
41. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. at 419 n.13; Barr v. Mateo, 360 U.S. 564, 571 (1959)
(plurality opinion); Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579,581 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S.
949 (1950) ("to submit all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to the burden of a trial
and to the inevitable danger of its outcome, would dampen the ardor of all btit the most
resolute"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 895 D, Comment c (1965).
42. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. at 377; Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. at 499 (1896).
43. See Freed, supra note 23, at 527-28.
44. 161 U.S. 483 (1896).
45. 161 U.S. at 498.
46. 161 U.S. at 498.
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tives.47 Relying on Spalding, the federal courts granted absolute immunity to lower-echelon federal executives for a wide variety of
alleged wrongs.48 A plurality of the Supreme Court adopted a similar rule in.Barr v. Matteo, 49 holding that discretionary acts within the
"outer perimeter'' of an official's statutory authority were not actionable despite allegations of malice.so Justice Harlan's opinion cited
Spalding and noted further that immunity had never been "a badge
or emolument of exalted office, but an expression of a policy
designed to aid in the effective functioning of government" based on
the duties entrusted by law to the particular officia1.s 1 Because many
governmental functions are delegated and redelegated throughout
the executive branch, immunity should attach to the responsible official rather than to the cabinet officer at the top of the hierarchy.s 2
Although the common law granted federal executive officials absolute immunity for discretionary actions within the scope of their
authority,s 3 the scope of this immunity has been reconsidered in re47. 161 U.S. at 498.
48. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 494 n.21 (1978); Gray, supra note 20, at 337-38.
49. 360 U.S. 564 (1959) (plurality opinion). The fact that Ba" is only a plurality opinion
has not deterred courts from relying on its rationale. See Freed, supra note 23, at 531-32. In
Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 487-91 (1978), the Court recognized that Barr was only a
plurality opinion, but implicitly accorded it precedential authority. Lower courts have frequently followed, with very little discussion, the rationale of the plurality in Barr. See, e.g.,
Bridges v. IRS, 433 F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1970) (Internal revenue officers - conversion); Morgan
v. Willingham, 424 F.2d 200 (10th Cir. 1970) (federal prison officers - battery); Scherer v.
Brennan, 379 F.2d 609 (7th Cir. 1967) (U.S. Treasury officers -trespass); Norton v. McShane,
332 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1964) (Attorney General - false arrest, battery), cert. denied, 380 U.S.
981 (1965).
50. 360 U.S. at 575. While one commentator has noted that Barr and Spalding could have
been limited to the defamation contexts in which they arose, see Freed, supra note 23, at 532
n.35, the lower federal courts interpreted Barr as making absolute immunity available in cases
involving other alleged torts. See, e.g., Sowders v. Damron, 457 F.2d 1182 (10th Cir. 1972);
Estate of Burks v. Ross, 438 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1971); Leighton v. Peters, 356 F. Supp. 900 (D,
Hawaii 1973).
51. 360 U.S. at 572-73.
52. See 360 U.S. at 573-74.
The scope of the immunity traditionally available to the highest executive officials in state
government is in dispute. Some authorities characterize "gubernatorial" immunity as absolute. See W. PROSSER, supra note 33, at 988. Others indicate that governors, see Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 419 (1976); Gray, supra note 20, at 344-45, along with lower state
administrative officials, received a narrower immunity- a "qualified" privilege, W. PROSSER,
supra note 33, at 989, conditioned on the absence of malice or improper purpose. See, e.g. ,
Paoli v. Mason, 325 Ill. App. 197,209, 59 N.E.2d 499, 504 (1945); Tillotson v. Fair, 160 Kan.
81, 89, 159 P.2d 471,476 (1945); Taulli v. Gregory, 223 La. 195, 198, 65 So. 2d 312,312 (1953);
Schwartz v. Heffernan, 304 N.Y. 474, 482, 109 N.E.2d 68 (1952); State ex. rel Robertson v.
Farmers' State Bank, 162 Tenn. 499, 505, 39 S.W.2d 281, 282-83 (1931); Logan City v. Allen,
86 Utah 375, 380, 44 P.2d 1085, 1087 (1935); Gray, supra note 20, at 342 & n.246. Qualified
immunity implicitly rests on the balancing inherent in immunity doctrine, see notes 16-36
supra and accompanying text, and on the judgment that deliberate misconduct by public officials harms society more than does the burden of actual or potential inquiries into an official's
state of mind. See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 586-92 (1959) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
53. See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 574-75 (1959) (plurality opinion).
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cent years. In particular, the availability of causes of action for constitutional torts 54 has forced the Supreme Court to review traditional
immunity doctrines and to consider their applicability to claims of
official misconduct violating constitutional rights. 55 Monroe v.
Pape, 56 which gave life to the federal cause of action under the Civil
Rights Act of 1871,57 supplied the initial impetus. Several courts
have noted that the Act's language does not explicitly recognize any
defenses or immunities, 58 and it has been suggested that the provision abrogated the traditional immunity of judges and legislators. 59
The Supreme Court, however, has not accepted this view. Instead, the Court has concluded that the immunity traditionally
granted to legislators,60 judges,61 and state prosecutors62 was so wellestablished that had Congress wished to abolish it, the statutory language would have revealed that intent more explicitly. Accordingly,
section 1983 "is to be read in harmony with general principles of tort
immunities and defenses rather than in derogation of them." 63 In
each case, therefore, the Court engages in a "considered inquiry into
the immunity historically accorded the relevant official at common
law and the interests behind it." 64 On the basis of this type of in54. See note 8 supra. See generally Nahmod, Section 1983 and the "Background" of Tort
Liability, SO IND. L.J. S (1974); Shape, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape and the Frontiers
Beyond, 60 Nw. U. L. REv. 277 (1965); Whitman, supra note 8; Note, .Damagesfar Federal
Employment .Discrimination: Section 1981 and Qualifted Executive Immunity, 85 YALE L.J. S18
(1976).
55. See Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391
(1979); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978); Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978);
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975); Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974). The Court agreed to review former President Nixon's claim of
absolute immunity to constitutional tort suits arising from his conduct while in office, see
Nixon v. Fitzgerald, cert. granted, 101 S. Ct 3106 (1981) (No. 79-1738), and a case involving
the immunity of a state court clerk, see Murray v. City of Chicago, 634 F.2d 365 (7th Cir.
1981), cert. granted sub nom. Finley v. Murray, 50 U.S.L.W. 3333 (U.S. Nov. 3, 1981) (No. 802205).
56. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
57. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. III 1979). Section 1983 provides in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of
any State or Territory, or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress.
58. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,417 (1976); Cobb v. City of Malden, 202 F.2d
701 (1st Cir. 1953).
59. See Picking v. Pennsylvania R.R., 151 F.2d 240, 250-51 (3d Cir. 1945); cf. Ex parte
Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879) (holding that a state judge could be held liable for violating a
federal statute prohibiting racial discrimination in jury selection).
60. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
61. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
62. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
63. 424 U.S. at 418.
64. 424 U.S. at 421. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508 (1978).
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quiry, the Court has held that the public interest in unrestrained legislative expression underlying the traditional grant of immunity65
warrants absolute legislative immunity to liability under section
1983.66 The Court has also concluded that the public interest in freeing judges and prosecutors to exercise their judgment without fear of
personal liability67 justifies absolute immunity to constitutional as
well as to common law claims. 68
Administrative officials have not fared as well when charged with
constitutional violations. Although judges, prosecutors, and legislators are absolutely immune to section 1983 liability,69 a variety of
other public servants, including prison officials,70 state hospital administrators,71 police officers,72 school board members,73 and state
executive officers,74 receive a more limited "qualified" immunity
against constitutional tort claims. The Court first attempted to define the parameters of this qualified immunity and to explain its rationale in Scheuer v. Rhodes.15 The plaintiff in Scheuer brought a
section 1983 claim against the Governor of Ohio based on his conduct as head of the state militia during the shootings at Kent State
University in 1970. To resolve the immunity question, the Court was
forced to balance several competing policies. On the one hand, the
"virtually infinite" range of choices typically confronting high executive officials76 and the confusing effect of a civil disorder on official
decision-making argue in favor of allowing officials broad discretion. 77 On the other hand, broad immunity may be inconsistent with
Congress's intention in section 1983 to provide "a remedy to parties
deprived of constitutional rights . . . by an official's use of his position."78 The Court struck a balance between these policies by granting a qualified immunity, the scope of which varies with "the scope
of discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circum65. See notes 40-42 supra and accompanying text.
66. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1951). Cf. Lake Country Estates, Inc. v.
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 405 (1979) (members of interstate planning
agency acting in "legislative capacity" absolutely immune to§ 1983 claims).
61. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
68. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
69. The official must be acting within the "outer perimeter" of his statutory authority. See
note 50 supra and accompanying text.
10. See Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978).
11. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
12. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
73. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
74. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
75. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
76. 416 U.S. at 246.
77. 416 U.S. at 246-47.
78. 416 U.S. at 243 (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961)).
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stances as they reasonably appeared." 79
Although the Scheuer Court may not have cut back on the immunity that would have been available to the Governor in a suit at
common law, 80 several considerations unique to constitutional litigation under section 1983 merit special attention. First, because section 1983 applies only to persons acting under color of state law, 81
the remedy that it creates would be "drained of meaning" if government officials as a class were absolutely immune from liability for
constitutional torts. 82 Section 1983 was not intended i,mplicitly to
repeal common-law immunities, 83 but a failure to consider seriously
the congressional purpose underlying the section before immunizing
defendants may lead to its effective repeal. Second, restricting immunity in section 1983 cases comports with the supremacy of the
Federal Constitution. If federal courts accord absolute immunity to
state executive officials for their unconstitutional conduct, "the fiat of
a state governor, and not the Constitution of the •United States,
would be the supreme law of the land." 84 Third, violations of constitutional rights perpetrated by public officials injure more compelling
societal interests than do violations of common-law duties. 85 The
79. 416 U.S. at 247-48.
In Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975), the Court refined the nature of qualified immunity. "[I]f [the official] knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took
within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the student
affected, or ifhe took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury," he is not immune. 420 U.S. at 322 (emphasis added). It is now
well-settled that Wood established two elements of the defense, one objective and one subjective. See, e.g., Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 562 (1978); Fowler v. Cross, 635 F.2d 476,
482 (5th Cir. 1981); Atcherson v. Siebenmann, 605 F.2d 1058, 1065 (8th Cir. 1979). The objective element precludes the defense if the right allegedly infringed was "clearly established" at
the time of the challenged conduct and provides a guidepost for assessing the reasonableness
of the defendant's belief in the legality of his conduct. See Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. at
562. Since the inquiry is legal rather than factual, this aspect of a qualified immunity claim is
amenable to determination on summary judgment. See Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192,
1209 (D.C. Cir. 1979), ajfd by an equally divided court, 101 S. Ct. 3132 (1981). But since the
subjective issue involves complex questions of fact, resolution on the basis of pleadings and
affidavits is generally inappropriate. See Miller v. DeLaune, 602 F.2d 198, 199 (9th Cir. 1979);
Rodgers v. Tolson, 582 F.2d 315, 319 (4th Cir. 1978).
SO. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 419 (1976). The Court's implied conclusion that
governors held qualified and not absolute immunity may be incorrect. See note 52 supra and
accompanying text.
81. See note 57 supra (quoting§ 1983).
82. 416 U.S. at 248.
83. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967).
84. 416 U.S. at 248 (quoting Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 397 (1932)).
85. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 495 (1978); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 196
(1961) (Harlan, J. concurring); Freed, supra note 23, at 550 (1977); Love, .Damages: A Remedy
far the Violation of Constitutional Rights, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 1242, 1273 (1979); Whitman, supra
note 8, at 55; cf. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978) (nominal damages absent proof of
actual injury appropriate because of the societal importance of procedural due process). See
generally Katz, supra note 8; Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposals to Strengthen the
Section 1983 .Damage Remedyfor Law Eeforcers' Misconduct, 87 YALE LJ. 447 (1978).
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greater offense to public values that inheres in constitutional violations represents an additional factor to be weighed against the benefits derived from immunity. 86
After establishing a framework for analyzing official immunity to
liability for constitutional torts in section 1983 cases, the Supreme
Court addressed the immunity of federal officials sued directly under
the Constitution in Butz v. Economou. 87 The plaintiff in Butz sued
the Secretary of Agriculture and various officials of the Agriculture
Department for allegedly unconstitutional conduct in proceedings to
suspend or revoke his company's registration. The Court rejected
the government's claim of absolute immunity and held that, subject
to specifically delineated exceptions, "qualified immunity from damages liability should be the general rule for executive officials
charged with constitutional violations."88 Consistent with the approach adopted in earlier cases, 89 the Court first examined the immunity traditionally accorded federal executive officials and
established that Butz's constitutional dimension presented a more
troubling question. Characterizing cases like Spalding v. Vilas and
Barr v. Matteo as holdings based on the official's authority to act, 90
the Court distinguished them by equating unconstitutional conduct
with the absence of authority.91 Because Spalding and Barr were not
directly applicable to constitutional tort cases, the Court looked to its
decisions on the immunity of state officials sued under section 1983
and found no basis for treating federal officials sued for infringing
constitutional rights differently. 92 Unless federal executive officials
demonstrate "exceptional circumstances" 93 or "special functions" 94
that justify absolute immunity, they can claim only qualified
immunity.
The Court's current approach to the scope of the immunity accorded federal executive officials in constitutional tort cases can thus
86. See Wolcher, Sovereign Immunity and the Supremacy Clause: .Damages Against Slates
in Their Own Courts for Constitutional Violations, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 189, 282 (1981). See
generally notes 30-36 supra and accompanying text.
87. 438 U.S. 478 (1978). See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980); Davis v. Passman, 442
U.S. 228 (1979); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
88. 438 U.S. at 508.
89. See notes 60-64 supra and accompanying text.
90. 438 U.S. at 492-96.
91. 438 U.S. at 492.
92. 438 U.S. at 504.
93. 438 U.S. at 507.
94. 438 U.S. at 508. The Court did not expressly distinguish "special functions" from "exceptional circumstances:" Nevertheless, it seems plausible to consider them as alternative avenues to absolute immunity. Exceptional circumstances would confer absolute immunity on an
official otherwise limited to qualified immunity. A special function routinely performed by a
particular official belonging to a broader employment class may warrant absolute immunity
notwithstanding a_general rule of qualified immunity for the class.
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be characterized as functional. 95 After exploring the justifications
for judicial and prosecutorial immunity,96 the Butz Court concluded
that these officials were immune not because they were employees of
a particular branch or agency of government, but because of the
functions that they perform. 97 Accordingly, officials discharging adjudicative and prosecutorial responsibilities within the Agriculture
Department were absolutely immune. This functional perspective
also appears in subsequent cases addressing the scope of legislative
and judicial immunity. The Court has observed, for example, that it
"is only for acts performed in his judicial' capacity that a judge is
absolutely immune." 98 And two cases involving congressmen have
limited their absolute immunity to activities closely connected to the
legislative functions that justify complete protection. 99
The Supreme Court has not yet applied this functional approach
to determine the scope of immunity available to members of the mil95. Writing for the majority, Justice White emphasized the importance of the function
performed by the official in determining the scope of his immunity no fewer than 12 times.
See 438 U.S. at 484,485,488, 508 (twice), 510 (twice), 512, 513, 514, 515, 516.
96. See 438 U.S. at 508-11.
97. See 438 U.S. at 511-12.
98. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 360 (1970). See Lynch v. Johnson, 420 F.2d 818,
820 (6th Cir. 1970); Atcherson v. Siebenmann, 458 F. Supp. 526, 538 (S.D. Iowa 1978), revd on
other grounds, 605 F.2d 1058 (8th Cir. 1979).
99. See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979); Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306
(1973). Similarly, in Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S.
391 (1979), the Court held members of an interstate planning agency absolutely immune to the
extent that they acted in a legislative capacity. Citing Butz, the Court reasoned that legislative
responsibilities justified absolute immunity for federal, state, and regional legislators. 440 U.S.
at 405 n.30. Cf. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976) (expressly reserving the
question whether prosecutor's absolute immunity extends to administrative or investigative
responsibilities).
Other immunities have also been restricted recently. "Diplomatic immunity" traditionally
provided absolute immunity to the representative of a foreign state, regardless of the function
he was performing. See, e.g., Berrizzi Bros. Co. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926); The Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812); Harvard Research in International Law,
.Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities, 26 AM. J. INTL. L. Supp. 15, 99 (1932). Within the past
few years many nations, including the United States, have rejected absolute diplomatic immunity in favor of a "functional necessity'' doctrine, which justifies privileges and immunities
only when they are necessary to enable the diplomatic mission to perform its functions. See
generally Garretson,,1ne Immunities ofRepresentatives ofForeign States, 41 N.Y.U. L. REv.
67 (1966); Ling,A Comparative Study ofthe Privileges and Immunities of l/nited Nations Member Representatives and Officials with the Traditional Privileges and Immunities of Diplomatic
Agents, 33 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 91 (1976); O'Keefe, Privileges and Immunities of the Diplomatic Family, 25 INTL. & COMP. L.Q. 329 (1976). Congress responded to this change in philosophy regarding diplomatic immunity by passing the Diplomatic Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 95393, 92 Stat. 808 (28 U.S.C. § 1364 (Supp. III 1979)). The Act narrows the immunity available
to diplomats, their families, and staffs. See Note, 10 CASE W. REs. J. INTL. L. 827 (1978). See
also L. GORE-BOOTH, SATOw's GUIDE TO DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE 120-55 (1979).
Restricting diplomatic immunity to particular functions is similar to the Supreme Court's
approach to executive immunity for constitutional torts. Butz v. Economou emphasized that
the crucial factor in determining whether an official would receive absolute immunity is
whether such broad protection is necessary to enable the official to function effectively. 438
U.S. at 512. This reflects the idea that immunity is a burden on the general public that only a
corresponding public benefit can justify.
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itary charged with depriving fellow servicemen of their constitutional rights. Technically, members of the armed forces are
"executive officials," 100 and are thus subject to the Butz rule. The
special perspective that the Court has recently brought to military
affairs, 101 however, may demand a more extensive policy analysis.
In the absence of a definitive statement by the Supreme Court, many
lower courts continue to apply immunity rules developed in nonconstitutional contexts. 102 But recent developments in the law of immunity- specifically, the adoption of qualified immunity standards for
constitutional suits against executive officials -justify a reexamination of the absolute immunity standard that these courts have applied to military officials. Part II undertakes such a reexamination.
It finds that courts granting absolute immunity to members of the
military rely primarily on Feres v. United States, 103 a case that can be
plausibly distinguished, and on policy considerations such as the importance of military discipline that justify no more than a qualified
immunity.
II. A

FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO INTRAMILITARY IMMUNITY

A. Feres v. United States

Courts that hold military defendants absolutely immune to constitutional tort claims brought by other servicemen often rely on
Feres v. United States.1 04 In Feres, a serviceman's widow alleged
100. See note 9 supra.
101. See Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 360 (1980); cf. Rostker v. Goldberg, 101 S. Ct.
2646 (1981) (upholding exclusion of women from draft registration statute); Note, Women and
the .Dreft: The Constitutionalil)' ofAll-Male Registration, 94 HARV. L. REV. 406, 421 (1980)
("The Supreme Court has thus set aside an area of military competence in which the judiciary
will not apply the level of constitutional scrutiny applicable to similar governmental actions in
other contexts.").
102. See Sigler v. LeVan, 485 F. Supp. 185, 189-92 (D. Md. 1980); Nagy v. United States,
471 F. Supp. 383, 384 (D.D.C. 1979); Thornwell v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 344, 348
(D.D.C. 1979); Misko v. United States, 453 F. Supp. 513, 515 (D.D.C. 1978), q(fd., 593 F.2d
1371 (D.C. Cir. 1979); cf. Schmid v. Rumsfeld, 481 F. Supp. 19, 21 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (noting
Supreme Court immunity holdings, but applying Feres doctrine nonetheless). But see Tigue v.
Swaim, 585 F.2d 909 (8th Cir. 1978); Alvarez v. Wilson, 431 F. Supp. 136 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
103. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
104. See Sigler v: LeVan, 485 F. Supp. 185, 189-92 (D. Md. 1980); Schmid v. Rumsfeld,
481 F. Supp. 19, 21 (N.D. Cal. 1979); Nagy v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 383, 384 (D.D.C.
1979); Thornwell v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 344, 347-52 (D.D.C. 1979); Misko v. United
States, 453 F. Supp. 513, 514-16 (D.D.C. 1978), q(fd., 593 F.2d 1371 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Birdwell
v. Schlesinger, 403 F. Supp. 710, 718 (D. Colo. 1975). Some courts find this result repugnant.
See, e.g., Jaffe v. United States, 479 F. Supp. 632, 635 (D.N.J. 1979), q(fd., No. 79-1543 (3d
Cir. Nov. 2, 1981) (en bane):
This unjust application of the Feres rule is perhaps best summed up in a colloquy
between this Court and the government at oral argument:
The Court: [A]s I read the law, it doesn't matter if they stood up there and said, "one,
two, three, left, right, left," and marched them over a cliff . . . You'd be protected under
Feres • •. ?
Mr. Landman: Yes, your Honor.

December 1981]

Note -

Intramilitary Immunity

325

that a negligently maintained furnace caused the barracks fire in
which her husband died. The Supreme Court held that the United
States could not be sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act of
1946 105 (FTCA) for injuries to active-duty servicemen resulting from
the negligence of others in the armed forces. 106 Despite strong criticisms of the Peres rule, 107 its abandonment appears unlikely in light
of the Court's recent reaffirmation of its earlier decision in Stencel
Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States . 108
Although Feres remains valid in negligence suits against the

United States under the FTCA, it is a suspect foundation for broad
intramilitary immunity from liability for constitutional torts. Because the plaintiff sued the United States rather than a member of
the military, the decision in Feres turned on the Court's view of the
effect of the FTCA on the sovereign immunity of the United States
and not on its interpretation of the principle of individual immunity.109 Despite this limitation on the Court's holding, a number of
lower courts have extended Feres to suits against individuals, 110 citing Justice Jackson's statement in the majority opinion that "[w]e
know of no American law which has ever permitted a soldier to recover for negligence, against either his superior officers or the Government he is serving."m But this statement cannot even supply
support by analogy for absolute intramilitary immunity against liability for constitutional torts since Justice Jackson implied that the
United States would be liable for intentional torts. He buttressed his
frequently cited statement with a comparative reference to JJinsman
v. Wilkes 112 and Weaver v. Ward, 113 which indicate that intentional
torts within the military were actionable at common law. 114
On the basis of JJinsman, one may seriously question the extent
to which absolute immunity was historically accorded members of
105. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346(b)-1346(c), 1402(b), 1504, 2110, 240l(b), 2402, 24ll(b), 2412,
2671-80 (1976).
106. 340 U.S. at 146. See generally Note, From Feres to Stencel: Should Military Personnel
Have Access to .FTCA Recovery?, 77 MICH. L. REv. 1099 (1979).
107. See Note, supra note 106, at 1100 n.8.
108. 431 U.S. 666 (1977).
109. 340 U.S. at 138. (''The only issue of law raised is whether the Tort Claims Act extends its remedy to one sustaining 'incident to the service' what under other circumstances
would be an actionable wrong.").
110. See, e.g., Misko v. United States, 453 F. Supp. 513, 515 (D.D.C. 1978), q/fd., 593 F.2d
1371 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Nagy v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 383, 384 (D.D.C. 1979).
111. 340 U.S. at 141 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Since Feres was an FTCA suit
against the government, see note 109 Slljlra, Justice Jackson's reference to common-law actions
against individual officers was dicta.
112. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 390 (1851).
113. 80 Eng. Rep. 284 (K.B. 161~.
114. See 340 U.S. at 141 n.10.
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the military against claims brought by other servicemen. 115 In that
case, the Court held that an officer sued by a marine for false imprisonment was subject to liability if he had not acted in good faith. 116 It
is noteworthy that .Dinsman was cited not only in Feres, but also in
Butz v. Economou, 117 which established the general rule according
federal executive officials only a qualified immunity against constitutional tort claims. Like Butz, .Dinsman reflects considered balancing
of individual rights against the effective discharge of a governmental
function; 118 .Dinsman's good faith rule is thus consistent with the immunity doctrine that the Court currently applies to other federal executive officials who have allegedly committed constitutional torts. 119

B. Military .Discipline
Feres does not provide precedential support for a rule of absolute
intramilitary immunity in constitutional tort cases, but courts may
find justification for such a rule in the policies underlying that decision. Chief among those policies is the need to maintain discipline
within the military.1 20 In United States v. Brown ,1 21 another negli115. The absence of a co=on-law tradition of absolute immunity arguably means that
the particular official would enjoy at most a qualified immunity to constitutional tort claims;
nothing in recent immunity doctrine suggests that a constitutional tort suit requires greater
immunity. Yet there appear to be no cases that apply this theoretical proposition. More importantly, it seems safe to presume that "the functions and responsibilities of . . . particular
defendants" and the purposes that constitutional tort liability serve constitute the heart of the
immunity issue. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 243 (1974).
116.The case, therefore, turns upon the motive which induced Captain Wilkes to inflict
the punishments complained of. . . . If they find that the punishment of the plaintiff was
in any manner or in any degree increased or aggravated by malice or a vindictive feeling
towards him on the part of Captain Wilkes, or by a disposition to oppress him, then the
plaintiff is entitled to recover.
53 U.S. (12 How.) at 404-05.
117. See 438 U.S. at 491-92. The Court expressly acknowledged that .Dinsman implicated
military discipline, yet relied on it even though Feres had been decided in the interim, thereby
suggesting that the Court intended to leave claims {or intramilitary intentional torts available.
Justice Jackson, Feres's author, had only recently returned from service as chief United States
prosecutor at the Nuremberg war crimes trials, see R. JACKSON, THE NUREMBERG CASE 97
(1947), and was likely to have retained a harsh view of military improprieties.
118. In .Dinsman, the Court stated:
[I]t is essential to [military] security and efficiency that the authority and co=and confided to the officer, when it has been exercised from proper motives, should be firmly
supported in the courts of justice, as well as on shipboard. And if it is not, the flag of the
United States would soon be dishonored in every sea. But at the same time it must be
borne in mind that the nation would be equally dishonored if it permitted the humblest
individual in its service to be oppressed and injured by his co=anding officer, from
malice or ill-will, or the wantonness of power, without giving him redress in the courts of
justice.
53 U.S. (12 How.) at 403.
119. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. at 498, 507; Dinsman v. Wilkes, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at
404.
120. See Burgess, Official Immunity and Civil Liability far Constitutional Torts Commllled
by Military Commanders Afler Butz v. Economou, 89 MIL. L. REV. 25, 42 (1980); Note, supra
note 106, at 1109.
121. 348 U.S. 110 (1954).
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gence suit brought under the FTCA, the Supreme Court explained
that Feres reflected a concern for the adverse effects that FTCA suits
based on "negligent orders given or negligent acts committed in the
course of military duty'' would have on military discipline. 122 A
number of courts have found this concern relevant not only to negligence suits but also to suits alleging intentional torts, and have thus
barred suits between servicemen regardless of the potential defendant's subjective intent or the reasonableness of his belief in the legality of his actions. 123 This Section analyzes the interest in military
discipline in cases involving cognizable constitutional claims. It concludes that unless certain exceptional situations or special functions
are involved, a general rule of qualified immunity adequately protects the needs of the military while affording broader recognition of
servicemen's constitutional rights.
Courts that ground immunity in the need for military discipline
fear that allowing servicemen to sue their superiors would undermine obedience and respect for officers. This fear is unfounded.
Discipline 124 is, of course, essential to the functioning of the armed
forces, 125 and the need to maintain discipline has justified narrowing
the scope of servicemen's constitutional rights in certain instances. 126
No one would seriously contend, however, that all constitutional
122.The peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors, the effects of the
maintenance of such suits on discipline, and the extreme results that might obtain if suits
under the Tort Claims Act were allowed for negligent orders given or negligent acts committed in the course of military duty, led the [Feres] Court to read that Act as excluding
claims of that character.
348 U.S. at 112. See also Stencel Aero Engr. Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 673 (1977);
United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 162 (1963) (Feres "best explained" by the discipline
interest noted in Brown); Thornwell v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 344, 348 (D.D.C. 1979).
See Jacoby, The Feres Doctrine, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 1281, 1286-87 (1973); Rhodes, The Feres
Doctrine After Twenty-Five Years, A.F. L. REv., Spring 1976, at 24, 29. Nothing in Feres,
however, expressly supports this characterization. Instead, one commentator contends that
Justice Jackson's reference in Feres to a "distinctively federal" relationship between a soldier
and the government "connotes exclusive disciplinary authority over military personnel."
Note, supra note 106, at 1110. For modern criticisms of the expressed justifications for the
result in Feres itself, see id. at 1102-09, 1118-21; Note, Tori Remedies For Servicemen Injured by
Military Equipment: A Case For Federal Common Law, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 601 (1980).
123. See, e.g., Bailey v. Van Buskirk, 345 F.2d 298,298 (9th Cir. 1965) ("The idea is that
an undisciplined army is a mob and he who is in it would weaken discipline if he can civilly
litigate with others in the army over the performance of another man's army duty."), cert.
denied, 383 U.S. 948 (1966); c.f. Downes v. United States, 249 F. Supp. 626, 628 (E.D.N.C.
1965) (claim allowed only because alleged injury not "incident to service").
124. "Discipline" as used in this Note includes not only the willingness of subordinate
servicemen to obey their superior officers but also encompasses qualities ofloyalty and morale.
125. E.g., Westmoreland, Military Justice - A Commander's Viewpoint, IO AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 5, 5 (1971); AIR FORCE RESERVE OFFICERS' TRAINING CORPS, THE MILITARY JUSTICE
SYSTEM 2 (rev. ed. 1962). See IO U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1976 & Supp. III 1979) (Uniform Code of
Military Justice) [UCMJ]. UCMJ, article 134, prohibits "[a]ll disorders and neglects to the
prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces."
126. See Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980); Parkerv. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974). Nevertheless, acceptance of "military necessity" to justify curtailing constitutional rights prompted
the tragic internment of Americans of Japanese descent during World War II. See Korematsu
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safeguards evaporate when a civilian enters military service. 127 Yet
absolute immunity precludes servicemen from bringing constitutional tort claims even if the potential defendants acted in bad faith
or disregarded rights that are clearly protected despite military
needs. 128 The policy argument for absolute immunity thus rests on
the dubious proposition that a serviceman is more likely to respect
authority when he has no recourse for the intentional or malicious
deprivation of his constitutional rights. The contrary idea - that
safeguarding rights compatible with military needs will engender respect for authority and promote discipline - is more appealing. It
has long been recognized that "[t]he discipline which makes the
soldiers of a free country reliable in battle is not to be gained by
harsh or tyrannical treatment. On the contrary, such treatment is far
more likely to destroy than to make an army." 129 The exercise of
authority in a manner consistent with both military interests and personal rights promotes discipline more effectively than irrational authoritarianism, 130 and this fact has not been ignored by those who
design the military's training programs. 13I
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding relocation of Japanese-Americans); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (upholding curfew for Japanese-Americans).
127. See, e.g., Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953); Anderson v. Laird, 466 F.2d 283 (D.C.
Cir.}, cert denied, 409 U.S. 1076 (1972); Constitutional Rights of Military Personnel· Summary
- Report ofHearings on ,$. Res. .58 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights ofthe Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. iii (1963) (remarks of Sen. Ervin) ("No one
should be more entitled to protection of their constitutional rights than the serviceman engaged in protecting the sovereignity of the United States."); Warren, Tire Bill ofRights and /1,e
Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 181, 188 (1962). The military courts themselves frequently invoke constitutional safeguards for servicemen. See, e.g., United States v. Ruiz, 23 C.M.A. 181,
48 C.M.R. 797 (1974); United States v. Tempia, 16 C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249 (1967); if.
O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969) (conditioning military court jurisdiction in criminal
cases on a showing that alleged offense was "service-connected"), See generally Comment,
Army .Drug Treatment Programs and the .Doctrine of Military Necessity: Committee for G.I.
Rights v. Callaway and United States v. Ruiz, IO HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV, 215 (1975).
128. See notes 25-26 and accompanying text and note 79 supra.
129. Address by Maj. General John M. Schofield to the class of 1879 at West Point, reprinted in AIR FORCE CADET WING, CONTRAILS 229 (1971 ed.). The statement must be memorized by all cadets during their first year.
130. See M. JANOWITZ & R. LITTLE, SOCIOLOGY AND THE MILITARY EsTABLISHMENT 4345 (rev. ed. 1965). After adoption of the Uniform Code of Military Justice in 1950, Pub. L. No.
506, 64 Stat. 107 (codified at IO U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)), a judicial code for
the military intended to protect servicemen's rights and military interests, see notes 135-39
infra and accompanying text, some sources reported a positive effect due to the perceived
fairness of the new system. See 1960 U.S.C.M.A. Ann. Rep. 4 (statements of General
Lemnitzer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and General Decker, Army Chief of Staff).
Similar views have been expressed by-ranlfing-effieers of the Army and Navy. See id. (statement of General Decker); (Navy Judge Advocate General) Mott,An Appraisal ofthe Proposed
Changes in the Un!form Code ofMilitary Justice, 35 ST. JOHNS L. REV. 300 (1961).
131. See M. JANOWITZ, THE PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER 43-44 (1960); Campbell & McCormack, Military Experience and Attitudes Toward Authority, 62 AM. J. Soc. 482 (1957); Hollander, Authoritarianism and Leadership Choice in a Military Selling, 49 J. ABNORMAL & Soc,
PSYCH. 365 (1954); Sherman, Legal Inadequacies and .Doctrinal Restraints in Controlling tl,e
Military, 49 IND. LJ. 539, 572 (1974). In his work, Janowitz relies in part upon an Air Force
report that notes: ''We are on the ~cipline target when an airman feels that he is living under
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Recent Supreme Court decisions reflect a similar theme. Cases
restricting the constitutional protections afforded servicemen132 expressly leave actionable conduct that "irrationally, invidiously or arbitrarily'' deprives servicemen of rights that civilians enjoy. 133 It is
at least tenable to conclude that Supreme Court recognition of
claims arising from such behavior impliedly rejects a general rule of
absolute immunity precluding them. 134
Further evidence against a rule of absolute intramilitary immunity to liability for constitutional torts can be found in congressional
enactments regulating military conduct. The Uniform Code of Military Justice 135 (UCMJ), the military's judicial code, contains two
provisions evincing Congress's belief that some acts are neither necessary nor tolerable in an effective military organization. 136 The
UCMJ imposes criminal sanctions for many of the actions that
would give rise to constitutional tort claims. 137 Individual civil liability in such cases represents an additional deterrent to conduct that
violates the military's own standard of conduct. And article 139 of
the UCMJ allows a subordinate to recover damages when his superules which protect and support him." Office of the Air Provost Marshall, The Inspector General Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, .Discipline in the U.S. Air Force 6 (1955) [hereinafter cited
as Air Force .Discipline].
132. See Secretary of the Navy v. Huff, 444 U.S. 453 (1980) (per curiam); Brown v. Glines,
444 U.S. 348 (1980).
133. See Secretary of the Navy v. Huff, 444 U.S. at 458 n.5 ("ff]he federal courts are open
to assure that, in applying the regulations, co=anders do not abuse the discretion necessarily
vested in them."); Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. at 357 n.15 (quoting Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828,
840 (1976)).
134. Cf. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 701 (1978) (rendering municipalities amenable to suit under § 1983 would be meaningless if absolute i=unity were
available).
135. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). The Constitution gives Congress
power "to make rules for the Government and Regulation of the Land and Naval forces."
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14. Congress enacted the UCMJ in 1950 to protect the rights of
soldiers and increase public confidence in the armed forces while maintaining efficient performance of military functions. See 96 CONG. REc. 1353-61 (1950) (remarks of Sen.
Kefauver); note 136 infra.
136. See 96 CONG. REc. 1370 (1950) (remarks of Sen. Morse):
[W]hether a man wears a uniform or a business suit, he is entitled to the protection
afforded by the fundamental principles of American justice which I believe were contemplated when the Constitution was adopted.
Some of the excesses of the military in the administration of military justice in the
history of this country are simply shocking. As a Member of the Senate I shall raise my
voice in doing what I can to see to it that the basic principJ_~_ of justice . . . are written
into any court-martial bill passed by the Congress.
137. See, e.g., art. 93, 10 U.S.C. § 893 (1976) ("cruelty" or "maltreatment"); art. 97, 10
U.S.C. § 897 (1976) (unlawful detention); art. ll8, 10 U.S.C. § 918 (1976) (murder); art. 128, 10
u.s.c. § 928 (1976) (assault); F. WEINER, THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE 188-237
(1950). Further evidence of congressional intent may be inferred from the Privacy Act of 1974,
5 U.S.C. 552a (1976), which allows a civil action by a government employee (including servicemen) against the government and responsible individual. See Rhodes, The Feres .Doctrine
Afler Twenty-Five Years, A.F. L. REv., Spring 1976, at 24, 27 n.29.
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rior officer willfully takes or injures his property, 138. In these areas,
at least, the UCMJ rejects the notion that litigation over certain behavior within the military will interfere with the effectiveness of the
armed forces. Both the criminal and civil provisions, moreover, are
consistent with restricting immunity to actions taken in good faith
and within the scope of established constitutional standards. 139
Eliminating the general rule of absolute intramilitary immunity
has several practical advantages as well. Greater recognition of servicemen's constitutional rights will not only promote respect for authority within the military, but should also enable the armed forces
to meet their manpower needs more successfully.1 40 Surveys demonstrate that servicemen most frequently explain their failure to reenlist by citing "excessive interference with personal autonomy and
personal dignity.'' 141 It seems reasonable to presume that media reports of peacetime military practices that cause injury or death to
servicemen142 undermine the military's public image and consequently impair recruiting efforts. An opportunity to redress constitutional violations would be a significant step toward correcting this
handicap. But the military must be concerned with the quality of its
recruits and training experience as well as sheer numbers. The increased complexity and sophistication of modem warfare require
servicemen capable of exercising independent judgment and initiative.143 Psychological studies indicating a decrease in authoritarian
tendencies upon completion of air cadet training imply that group
interdependence rather than formal authority structure provides the
foundation for modem military effectiveness. 144 These studies provide inferential support for the proposition that a rule of qualified
immunity, which should reduce authoritarianism, is more consistent
138. IO U.S.C. § 939 (1976).
139. See note 79 supra.
140. The armed forces' recent ~iffi.culties in meeting recruitment goals have raised public
concern and spawned suggestions to resume the draft. See, e.g., 126 CoNo. REc. Sl6267-72
(daily ed. Dec. 11, 1980) (remarks of Sen. Durenburger); Maskos, How lo Save the All- Volunteer Force, Pua. INTEREST, Fall 1980, at 74; Bill Introduced in Senate lo Reinstate IJreft, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 25, 1981, at B7, col. 2. Quality as well as quantity is a matter of serious concern to
responsible officials. See, e.g., Laird Calls U.S. Forces Ill-Armed lo £Jeter War, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 21, 1980, at 47, col. 4; Tower Calls Some Jets and Carriers Unready, N.Y. Times, Sept. 26,
1980, at A24, col. 5; Halloran,Army Recruiters Troubled by Poor Quality of Volunteers, N.Y.
Times, July 6, 1980, at 15, col. I.
141. M. JANOWITZ, supra note 131, at xxi-xxii.
142. See note 2 supra.
143. See M. JANOWITZ & R. LITTLE, supra note 130, at 43; Walsh, Can the Military Cope
With Thirteen Books?, 50 A.B.A. J. 67 (1964); Army's Chief Calls Weapons Adequate, N.Y.
Times, July 16, 1980, at 20, col. 1. See generally S.L.A. MARSHALL, MEN AGAINST FIRE
(1947). The failure of individual soldiers to exercise some independent judgment before exe•
cuting orders may have even more devastating consequences than an inefficient military. See
generally s. HERSH, MY LAI 4 (1979); R. JACKSON, supra note ll7.
144. See M. JANOWITZ, supra note 131, at 42-43; Campbell & McCormack, supra note 13 I.
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with the needs of a modem military establishment than is the traditional rule of absolute immunity.
An immunity of ''varying scope," 145 moreover, is more consistent
with the diverse nature of the military establishment than a general
rule of absolute immunity. The military is an immense and complex
organization, 146 and many "military" responsibilities have exact
counterparts in civilian life. 147 Servicemen may be doctors, lawyers,
accountants, cooks, photographers, and band directors as well as
combat soldiers. Butz v. Economou and its predecessors 148 teach that
absolute immunity to liability for constitutional torts can be justified
only by the nature of an official's responsibilities and the societal
interests at stake. 149 Military personnel performing "special functions" or confronting "exceptional" situations 150 that demonstrably
require absolute immunity will remain fully protected from both the
risk of liability and the burdens of defending a suit. In Tigue v.
Swaim, 151 for example, the court held that while Butz precluded
conferring absolute immunity on military officers in every peacetime
situation, a "more particularized ground" could warrant barring
suits against certain defendants. 152 Tigue thus granted absolute immunity to a medical officer responsible for evaluating members of
nuclear missile crews. Similarly, exceptional circumstances such as
combat 153 could also justify absolute immunity. In combat situa145. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247 (1974).
146. As of 1979, !here were 2,987,000 persons in Ihe United States military. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE: BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 1980, 374 (1980).
147. See DEPT. OF THE NAVY, BUREAU OF NAVAL PERSONNEL, THE NAVAL OFFICER
CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM 10 (1962) (chart of Navy job classifications including "graphic arts,"
"food service," and "general dental"). As one court observed:
[T]he defendants . . . are hardly at Ihe brink of combat. These defendants are physicians. . . • The nature of defendants' actual duties tempers Ihe military need for absolute
immunity.
Alvarez v. Wilson, 431 F. Supp. 136, 145-46 (N.D. Ill. 1977). The system of rank is an obvious
way in which Ihe military draws important distinctions among its members. See United States
v. Means, 10 M.J. 162, 9 M.C.R. 2147 (C.M.A. 1981) (officer guilty of misconduct treated more
harshly Ihan enlisted man guilty of same offense); 37 U.S.C. § 201 (1976) (establishing pay
rates according to rank). Congress also differentiates soldiers according to Ihe character of
!heir military responsiblities. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 301-12 (1976) (establishing various pay rates
for hazardous duty, aviation, nuclear-qualified officers, sea duty and combat); 26 U.S.C. § 112
(1976) (excluding from gross income amounts earned by members of Ihe armed forces in
combat).
148. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974);
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
149. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. at 511-12; Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. at 423;
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. at 246-47.
150. See notes 93-94 supra.
151. 585 F.2d 909 (81h Cir. 1978).
152. 585 F.2d at 913-14. See Alvarez v. Wilson, 431 F. Supp. 136, 144-46 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
153. Language in Ihe FTCA reflected Congress's view Ihat combat is a unique situation
Ihat should not give rise to civil damage suits among servicemen. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(i)
(1976). The section led some commentators to believe Ihat Feres was wrong even as it applied
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tions, military commanders must act decisively to discharge their responsibilities in the public interest, and few would question the
relevance of the traditional justifications for absolute immunity.
Even if an official cannot demonstrate circumstances that justify
absolute immunity, several considerations suggest that the broader
constitutional protection afforded by qualified immunity will not unduly burden a military defendant. First, the Supreme Court has
tended to define the substantive constitutional rights of servicemen
in a manner that entails substantial deference to the military's interest in discipline.1 54 Whether an official's action, if proved, would
contravene a serviceman's constitutional rights can be addressed on
a motion for summary judgment without imposing burdens significantly greater than those associated with claims of absolute immunity.155 Second, if the right in question is found valid despite
military considerations, but is not yet "clearly established," the defendant may not be charged with knowledge of it. 156 The defendant
in such a case need only plead and prove 157 subjective good faith to
escape liability. 158 Since these cases will typically involve irrational,
invidious, or arbitrary conduct that deprives servicemen of constitutional rights enjoyed by other citizens, 159 this moderate burden is
fully warranted.
CONCLUSION

Federal courts that confer absolute immunity on military defendants facing constitutional tort suits brought by other servicemen
to claims against the United States. See, e.g., Hitch, The Federal Tort Claims Act and Military
Personnel, 8 RUTGERS L. REV. 316 (1954); Note, Federal Liability to Personnel of the Armed
Forces, 20 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 90 (1951). However, the Court recently reaffirmed Feres's
holding that a serviceman may not collect under the FfCA for the negligence of another
serviceman in Stencel Aero Engr. Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666 (1977).
154. See note 126 supra and accompanying text.
155. Absolute immunity is premised on the alleged injury being "incident to service."
Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950). Moreover, the Court recently suggested that
federal courts should carefully review military conduct which irrationally deprives soldiers of
rights enjoyed by other citizens. See Secretary of the Navy v. Huff, 444 U.S. 453, 4S7-58, n.5
(1980) (per curiam); Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 357 n.15 (1980).
156. See Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 562 (1978); note 158 i'!fra.
157. In Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980), the Court held that qualified immunity is
an affirmative defense that the defendant must plead, and reversed a First Circuit case which
required a plaintiff to plead the absence of good faith. Justice Rehnquist concurred in a separate opinion in which he distinguished allocation of the burden of proof. 446 U.S. at 642
(Rehnquist, J., concurring). Most courts impose this burden on the defendants as well, See,
e.g., Gilker v. Baker, 576 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1978); Skehan v. Board of Trustees of Bloomsburg
State College, 538 F.2d 53 (3d Cir. 1976); McCray v. Burrell, 516 F.2d 357 (4th Cir. 1975) (en
bane), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 471 (1976); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 4S6 F.2d 1339
(2d Cir. 1972) (on remand).
158. See Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 562 (1978); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S.
308, 322 (1975).
159. See text at notes 127-28, 132-34 supra.
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rely on either infirm precedent or misunderstood policy. Because
Feres v. United States is a case far removed from the delicate balancing that conventional immunity analysis demands, the peculiar
needs of the military establishment provide the only possible basis
for absolute immunity. This Note has established that a general rule
of qualified immunity, with a limited number of exceptions for special functions or circumstances, will not impair the acceptance of authority necessary in an effective military organization. Qualified
immunity allows courts to tailor their rulings to the facts of particular cases - a significant advantage in light of the wide variety of
tasks and functions that servicemen perform. This greater flexibility
in tum enables courts to strike an appropriate balance between the
need for an effective military establishment and greater protection
for the constitutional rights that the military safeguards.

